Developing a cooperative bidding framework for sponsored search markets - An evolutionary perspective
Yuan, Yong1,2; Wang, Fei-Yue1,3; Zeng, Daniel1
Source PublicationINFORMATION SCIENCES
2016-11-10
Volume369Issue:NAPages:674-689
SubtypeArticle
AbstractSponsored search advertising (SSA) markets have witnessed soaring bid prices from advertisers, which have been considered to be a potential challenge to the long-term stability, profitability and effectiveness of the SSA ecosystem. One approach to addressing this challenge is identifying cooperative and stable bidding strategies for competing advertisers with the objective of reaching socially optimal outcomes in repeated SSA auctions. Although useful in analyzing advertiSers' bidding behavior in single auction sessions, static game-theoretic analysis and simulation studies in the extant SSA literature offer only limited insights for characterizing the long-term evolutionary dynamics and stability of advertisers' bidding behavior. In this paper, we address this problem by applying evolutionary game theory and Coevolutionary simulation. Our key finding is that a group of "nice" and retaliatory (NR) strategies can promote stable cooperation among competing advertisers. Advertisers using NR strategies will never deviate from cooperation first (nice) and always punish their rivals' deviations using competitive bids (retaliatory). The NR strategies are shown to be able to encourage advertisers to decrease their bids to obtain revenue that is equal to that awarded under the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism and are further shown to alleviate bid inflation effectively at the system level. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
KeywordSponsored Search Bid Inflation Evolutionary Game Theory Coevolutionary Simulation
WOS HeadingsScience & Technology ; Technology
DOI10.1016/j.ins.2016.07.041
WOS KeywordCHEAP-TALK ; AUCTIONS ; COMPETITION ; MECHANISM ; KEYWORDS ; DESIGN ; GAMES
Indexed BySCI ; SSCi
Language英语
Funding OrganizationNational Natural Science Foundation of China(71472174 ; 71102117 ; 61533019 ; 71232006 ; 61233001)
WOS Research AreaComputer Science
WOS SubjectComputer Science, Information Systems
WOS IDWOS:000383292500042
Citation statistics
Cited Times:4[WOS]   [WOS Record]     [Related Records in WOS]
Document Type期刊论文
Identifierhttp://ir.ia.ac.cn/handle/173211/12637
Collection复杂系统管理与控制国家重点实验室_先进控制与自动化
Affiliation1.Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Automat, State Key Lab Management & Control Complex Syst, Beijing, Peoples R China
2.Qingdao Acad Intelligent Ind, Qingdao, Peoples R China
3.Natl Univ Def Technol, Res Ctr Computat Expt & Parallel Syst, Changsha, Hunan, Peoples R China
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
Yuan, Yong,Wang, Fei-Yue,Zeng, Daniel. Developing a cooperative bidding framework for sponsored search markets - An evolutionary perspective[J]. INFORMATION SCIENCES,2016,369(NA):674-689.
APA Yuan, Yong,Wang, Fei-Yue,&Zeng, Daniel.(2016).Developing a cooperative bidding framework for sponsored search markets - An evolutionary perspective.INFORMATION SCIENCES,369(NA),674-689.
MLA Yuan, Yong,et al."Developing a cooperative bidding framework for sponsored search markets - An evolutionary perspective".INFORMATION SCIENCES 369.NA(2016):674-689.
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