Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria of GSP Keyword Auction

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	Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria of GSP Keyword Auction
	Li, Linjing1 ; Zeng, Daniel; Zhao, Huimin 2
发表期刊	JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS
	2012
卷号	13 期号:2 页码:57-87
文章类型	Article
摘要	Despite the tremendous commercial success of generalized second-price (GSP) keyword auctions, it still remains a big challenge for an advertiser to formulate an effective bidding strategy. In this paper, we strive to bridge this gap by proposing a framework for studying pure-strategy Nash equilibria in GSP auctions. We first analyze the equilibrium bidding behaviors by investigating the properties and distribution of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Our analysis shows that the set of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of a GSP auction can be partitioned into separate convex polyhedra based on the order of bids if the valuations of all advertisers are distinct. We further show that only the polyhedron that allocates slots efficiently is weakly stable, thus allowing all inefficient equilibria to be weeded out. We then propose a novel refinement method for identifying a set of equilibria named the stable Nash equilibrium set (STNE) and prove that STNE is either the same as or a proper subset of the set of the well-known symmetrical Nash equilibria. These findings free both auctioneers and advertisers from complicated strategic thinking. The revenue of a GSP auction on STNE is at least the same as that of the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and can be used as a benchmark for evaluating other mechanisms. At the same time, STNE provides advertisers a simple yet effective and stable bidding strategy.
关键词	Keyword Advertising Stability Generalized Second-price Sponsored Search Nash Equilibrium
WOS标题词	Science & Technology ; Technology
关键词[WOS]	SPONSORED SEARCH
收录类别	SCI ; SSCi
语种	英语
WOS研究方向	Computer Science ; Information Science & Library Science
WOS类目	Computer Science, Information Systems ; Information Science & Library Science
WOS记录号	WOS:000307843600001
引用统计	被引频次：3[WOS] [WOS记录] [WOS相关记录]
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://ir.ia.ac.cn/handle/173211/3670
专题	多模态人工智能系统全国重点实验室_互联网大数据与信息安全
作者单位	1.Chinese Acad Sci, State Key Lab Management & Control Complex Syst, Inst Automat, Beijing, Peoples R China 2.Univ Wisconsin Milwaukee, Sheldon B Lubar Sch Business, Milwaukee, WI USA
第一作者单位	中国科学院自动化研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Li, Linjing,Zeng, Daniel,Zhao, Huimin. Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria of GSP Keyword Auction[J]. JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS,2012,13(2):57-87.
APA	Li, Linjing,Zeng, Daniel,&Zhao, Huimin.(2012).Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria of GSP Keyword Auction.JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS,13(2),57-87.
MLA	Li, Linjing,et al."Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria of GSP Keyword Auction".JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS 13.2(2012):57-87.

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